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TWENTY QUESTIONS ABOUT AN INDIVIDUAL 
DEBTOR’S NAME UNDER AMENDED ARTICLE 9 
SECTION 9-503(A)(4) ALTERNATIVE A 
RICHARD H. NOWKA
*
 
ABSTRACT 
This Article answers questions created by the financing statement re-
quirements for sufficiency of the name of an individual debtor under the 
amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Article 9—Secured Transac-
tions. An individual debtor in a security interest transaction could be 
known by various names: birth certificate name, driver’s license name, 
passport name, or nickname. Revised Article 9 provides no guidance on 
what name is the correct name of the debtor for entry on the financing 
statement, and a financing statement that does not provide the correct 
name of the debtor does not perfect the security interest. To resolve this 
problem, the Joint Review Committee for Article 9 considered possible 
amendments to the individual debtor name requirements. Even the Joint 
Review Committee struggled with the issue, finally adopting two alterna-
tives for sufficiency of the name of an individual debtor and asking states 
to choose between them. The Uniform Law Commission and the American 
Law Institute accepted the proposal and have offered the alternatives to 
the states, along with other amendments to Article 9. The proposed effec-
tive date of the amendments to Article 9 is July 1, 2013. 
To date, most states have adopted Alternative A to section 9-503(a)(4) 
of amended Article 9. It is known as the “only if” rule. In accordance with 
this rule, a financing statement is sufficient only if it provides the name of 
the individual debtor as indicated on the debtor’s unexpired driver’s li-
cense. However, a secured party complying with section 9-503(a)(4) Al-
ternative A could still face many questions regarding the debtor’s name. 
This Article asks and answers twenty such questions. The Article also 
examines the statutory requirements of section 9-503(a)(4) Alternative A 
and how a filed financing statement that does not satisfy those require-
ments could nevertheless remain effective. 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Brooks L. Dickerson, better known in his community as Louie Dicker-
son, borrowed money from two banks.
1
 Each bank took a security interest 
in Dickerson’s cattle.
2
 The first secured party filed a financing statement 
providing the debtor’s name as “Louie Dickerson.”
3
 The second secured 
party filed a financing statement providing the debtor’s name as “Brooks 
L. Dickerson.”
4
 Do both financing statements sufficiently provide the 
name of the debtor? Cases such as this have presented problems for courts 
trying to determine whether the financing statement complies with the 
Article 9, section 9-502 requirement that the financing statement “provides 
the name of the debtor.”
5
 The only direct guidance from Article 9 was that 
the “financing statement sufficiently provides the name of the debtor ... 
only if it provides the individual ... name of the debtor.”
6
 Article 9 pro-
vides no explanation of the meaning of “individual name,”
7
 so a few juris-
dictions adopted their own legislation to answer that question.
8
 This uncer-
tainty led the Article 9 Review Committee to include the matter on its list 
of issues being considered by a drafting committee.
9
 
                                                 
1 Peoples Bank v. Bryan Bros. Cattle Co., 504 F.3d 549, 551 (5th Cir. 2007). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 552. 
5 “Subject to subsection (b), a financing statement is sufficient only if it: (1) provides 
the name of the debtor ....” U.C.C. § 9-502(a)(1) (2002) (The 2002 Official Text of the 
U.C.C., better known as “Revised Article 9,” is the Official Text immediately preceding 
the Amendments to Article 9, the 2010 Approved Amendments.); see also In re Kinderk-
necht, 308 B.R. 71, 72–73 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (determining whether a nickname 
satisfies the Article 9 requirement); In re Jones, 2006 WL 3590097, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
Dec. 7, 2006) (determining whether a “full name” is required to satisfy the Article 9 
requirement); In re Stewart, 2006 WL 3193374, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Nov. 1, 2006) 
(determining whether any name other than the name on a birth certificate satisfies the 
Article 9 requirement). 
6 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (2002). One court noted that the caption for the debtor’s name 
box in the initial financing statement form approved in section 9-521(a) provides, “Deb-
tor’s Exact Full Legal Name.” In re Erwin, 2003 WL 21513158, at *9 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
June 27, 2003). 
7 See U.C.C. § 9-503. 
8 Tennessee and Texas amended their sections 9-503(a) to establish sufficiency of an 
individual debtor’s name if the financing statement provides the name as indicated on a 
driver’s license or identification card. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-503(a) (2010); TEX. BUS. 
& COM. CODE ANN. § 9.503(a)(4) (West 2009). 
9 U.C.C. Article 9 Review Comm., Statutory Modification Issues List, A.L.I. 1, 1–2 
(June 24, 2008), available at http://extranet.ali.org/directory/files/UCC9_IssuesList.pdf. 
The Uniform Law Commissioners and the American Law Institute formed the Article 9 
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After two years of study, the Joint Review Committee for Article 9, 
unable to agree on a single approach, recommended two alternatives for 
amending the requirements for sufficiency of the name of an individual 
debtor on a financing statement.
10
 Alternative A, labeled the “only if” 
alternative, mandates that “[a] financing statement sufficiently provides 
the name of the debtor ... if the debtor is an individual to whom this State 
has issued a [driver’s license] that has not expired, only if the financing 
statement provides the name of the individual which is indicated on the 
[driver’s license].”
11
 Alternative B, labeled the “safe harbor” alternative, 
states that: 
A financing statement sufficiently provides the name of the debtor ... if 
the debtor is an individual only if the financing statement: (A) ... pro-
vides the individual ... name of the debtor; (B) provides the surname 
and first personal name of the debtor; or (C) ... provides the name of the 
individual which is indicated on a [driver’s license] that this State has 
issued to the individual and which has not expired.12 
The Reporter’s Note to section 9-503 discloses the committee’s strug-
gle with the issue:
13
 
                                                                                                                         
Review Committee in 2008. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, 
DRAFT FOR APPROVAL AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 
(2010), at Reporter’s Prefatory Note 1, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll 
/archives/ulc/ucc9/2010am_draft.pdf [hereinafter ARTICLE 9 AMENDMENTS DRAFT FOR 
APPROVAL]. 
10 ARTICLE 9 AMENDMENTS DRAFT FOR APPROVAL, supra note 9, at Reporter’s Prefa-
tory Note 1. The note lists the many factors weighed by the committee in reaching its 
decision. Id. The Uniform Law Commissioners and the American Law Institute formed 
the Joint Review Committee after deciding to proceed with drafting amendments to 
Article 9. Id. 
11 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A) (Approved Amendments 2010). Alternatives A and B 
place brackets around “driver’s license” to allow a state to replace that term with an 
analogous term used by the state. See id. § 9-503 legis. n.3. If “this State” has not issued 
an unexpired driver’s license, Alternative A requires the “individual name of the debtor 
or the surname and first personal name of the debtor.” Id. § 9-503(a)(5). 
12 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. B). 
13 ARTICLE 9 AMENDMENTS DRAFT FOR APPROVAL, supra note 9, at Reporter’s Prefa-
tory Note 2. 
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The provisions governing the name required to be provided with re-
spect to a debtor who is an individual were the most contentious and 
perhaps the most difficult issues addressed by the Joint Review Com-
mittee. Recognizing the diversity of views, the Joint Review Commit-
tee recommends that each State be asked to choose between two alter-
natives.14 
The American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commissioners ap-
proved section 9-503 with the alternatives and have offered the Article 9 
amendments to the states for adoption.
15
 
Section 9-503(a)(4) Alternative B raises few questions regarding its 
operation. Because one of the Alternative B options is identical to the 
individual name requirement of pre-amendment Revised Article 9,
16
 filers 
and searchers will have familiarity with the requirement, regardless of the 
problems it created previously. The other safe harbors of Alternative B 
give filers two additional opportunities to provide a sufficient name on the 
financing statement.
17
 A secured creditor that acts with due diligence 
should have little trouble satisfying the debtor’s name requirement of 
Alternative B because any of three options is sufficient.
18
 
Section 9-503(a)(4) Alternative A, with its driver’s-license-only suffi-
ciency requirement, raises many questions concerning its operation. For 
example: What if the debtor has multiple driver’s licenses? What happens 
when the license expires? What happens when the debtor changes her 
name? What happens when the debtor moves to another state? The an-
swers to those questions are important because the majority of jurisdic-
tions adopting the Article 9 amendments also adopt Alternative A.
19
 This 
                                                 
14 Id. 
15 The amendments specify an effective date of July 1, 2013. U.C.C. § 9-801 (Ap-
proved Amendments 2010). 
16 The “financing statement sufficiently provides the name of the debtor ... only if it 
provides the individual ... name of the debtor ....” U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4)(A) (2002). 
17 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. B) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
18 Id. 
19 Of the nine jurisdictions that have enacted the Article 9 amendments to date, seven 
chose Alternative A: Indiana, H.B. 1321, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); 
Minnesota, S.F. 194, 87th Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); Nebraska, L.B. 90, 102d 
Legis. Sess. (Neb. 2011); Nevada, A.B. 109, 76th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2011); North Dakota, 
H.B. 1137, 62d Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2011); Rhode Island, H.B. 5573, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 
2011); and Texas, S.B. 782, 82d Leg. (Tex. 2011). Connecticut and Washington enacted 
Alternative B. H.B. 6274, 2011 Sess. (Ct. 2011); H.B. 1492, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2011). There is debate about which is the better alternative. See, e.g., Harry C. Sigman, 
Improvements (?) to the UCC Article 9 Filing System, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 457, 459 (2010–
11) (supporting Alternative B); American Bankers Association UCC Article 9 Working 
Group, Section 9-503. Name of Debtor and Secured Party Position Paper (Mar. 17, 
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Article asks and answers questions pertaining to satisfying the financing 
statement requirements for the name of an individual debtor under section 
9-503(a)(4) Alternative A. 
Part I of this Article examines the debtor’s name requirements of sec-
tions 9-503(a)(4) and (a)(5), Alternative A. Part II explains the Article 9 
sections that can save a financing statement that does not satisfy those 
requirements. Part III answers twenty questions that relate to complying 
with the debtor’s name requirements under Alternative A. 
I. SECTION 9-503(A)(4) ALTERNATIVE A 
Section 9-503(a)(4) Alternative A establishes the rule for sufficiency 
of the name of an individual debtor for a financing statement.
20
 If the ju-
risdiction governing perfection (“this State”) has issued a driver’s license 
that has not expired, a financing statement is sufficient as to the name of 
the debtor only if it provides the name of the individual as it is indicated 
on the driver’s license.
21
 The section creates a straightforward test—if this 
State has issued an unexpired driver’s license, a financing statement must 
provide the name indicated on the license.
22
 It is the only name that allows 
a financing statement to be sufficient.
23
 
In some states, the agency that issues a driver’s license also can issue 
an identification card to an individual who does not hold a driver’s li-
cense.
24
 The legislative note to section 9-503 advises those states to re-
place “driver’s license” in subsection (a)(4) with an appropriate term that 
                                                                                                                         
2011), http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/GeneralCounsel/UniformLaws/Article9Positi 
onPaper03172011.pdf (supporting Alternative A); Letter from Patrick M. Costell, Com-
mittee Co-Chair, Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Business Law Section of 
the State Bar of California, to Uniform Law Commission and Article 9 Review Commit-
tee, Re: Possible Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Individual Debtor 
Name Provisions (July 9, 2009), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ar 
chives/ulc/ucc9/letter_2009july9.pdf (supporting Alternative B); Barkley Clark, Four 
Reasons to Adopt Alternative A for Individual Debtor Names, AMERICAN BANKERS 
ASSOCIATION (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/GeneralCounsel/Uni 
formLaws/UCC9FourReasons03182011.pdf (supporting Alternative A). 
20 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
21 The drafters recognized that not all states will use the term “driver’s license” to de-
note the license that authorizes an individual to operate a motor vehicle. Id. § 9-503 legis. 
n.3. For example, a state may use “operator’s license.” Such states should insert the 
applicable term in section 9-503(a)(4). 
22 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
23 Id. 
24 See, e.g., Adult ID Card, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, http://www 
.dmv.state.va.us/webdoc/citizen/id/adult_id.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2012). 
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covers both documents.
25
 In a state whose section 9-503(a)(4) includes 
“driver’s license or identification card,” a financing statement is sufficient 
if it provides the name indicated on an identification card when the state 
has not issued a driver’s license.
26
 The Legislative Note limits this option 
to states where “an individual may hold either a driver’s license or an 
identification card but not both.”
27
 
“This State” in subsection (a)(4) is the state whose Article 9 governs 
perfection of the security interest determined under sections 9-301 and 
9-307.
28
 The general rule of section 9-301 is that the law of the jurisdiction 
where the debtor is located governs perfection.
29
 Section 9-307(b)(1) pro-
vides that an individual debtor is located at the individual’s principal resi-
dence.
30
 For example, if an individual debtor resides in Iowa, Iowa’s Ar-
ticle 9 governs perfection of a security interest created by the debtor. 
Secured parties must be cognizant of the order in which the driver’s li-
cense or identification card lists the debtor’s names. The first name listed 
on the license could be the debtor’s surname or the debtor’s first personal 
name. For example, a driver’s license that provides “John, Elton” could be 
indicating “John” as the surname or the first personal name.
31
 The secured 
party must provide the name of the debtor as indicated on the license in 
the correct boxes on the financing statement: “Individual’s Surname”; 
“First Personal Name”; and “Additional Name(s)/Initial(s).”
32
 Note that if 
                                                 
25 U.C.C. § 9-503 legis. n.3. Of the seven states that have enacted section 9-503(a)(4), 
Alternative A, only Nebraska did not include an identification card as a means for deter-
mining the debtor’s name. L.B. 90, 102d Legis. Sess. (Neb. 2011). For a list of states 
enacting Alternative A, see supra note 19. 
26 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 26-1-9.1-503, Version b. 
27 U.C.C. § 9-503 legis. n.3. 
28 Id. § 9-301(1); id. § 9-307(b). The first question a party should answer for any secu-
rity interest is: “Which jurisdiction’s Article 9 governs the security interest?” 
29 “Except as otherwise provided in this section, while a debtor is located in a jurisdic-
tion, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or non-
perfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral.” Id. § 9-301(1). 
30 Id. § 9-307(b)(1). The amendments to Article 9 amend only section 9-307(f), the 
location of a registered organization organized under federal law. Id. § 9-307(f)(2). 
31 Determining the surname and first personal name can be complicated for names 
from international cultures. See Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc., v. Frozsun Foods, Inc., 48 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 870–71 (Ca. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting Latin American naming conven-
tions as controlling under a U.S. law); All Bus. Corp. v. Choi, 634 S.E.2d 400, 401 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2006) (highlighting the difficulty in determining the surname of “Sang Woo 
Gu”). 
32 See U.C.C. § 9-503 cmt. 2d. The “Debtor’s Name,” box 2b, has spaces for the “In-
dividual’s Surname” and “First Personal Name,” and “Additional Name(s)/Initial(s).” See 
UCC Financing Statement (Form UCC1), INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’RS, http:// 
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a driver’s license does not provide a debtor’s additional name or initial, no 
such name is required or necessary.
33
 
Not every state will have issued either a driver’s license or an identifi-
cation card to an individual debtor, regardless of whether “this State” has 
laws authorizing an individual to obtain a driver’s license or identification 
card. An individual may decide to have neither form of identification. For 
example, an individual could use a government-issued passport for identi-
fication in lieu of a driver’s license or identification card. In those situa-
tions, section 9-503(a)(4) cannot apply because the state has not issued the 
requisite document.
34
 Section 9-503(a)(5) applies when subsection (a)(4) 
does not.
35
 Subsection (a)(5) establishes another “only if” rule.
36
 A financ-
ing statement is sufficient as to the name of the debtor “only if the financ-
ing statement provides the individual name of the debtor” or the “surname 
and first personal name of the debtor.”
37
 Use of either name sufficiently 
indicates the name of the debtor.
38
 
The “individual name of the debtor” option is identical to the name re-
quirement of pre-amendment section 9-503(a)(4)(A).
39
 Thus, the same 
difficulties a secured party encountered previously in determining the 
“individual name” of a debtor will continue into amended Article 9.
40
 
Nevertheless, a financing statement sufficiently provides the name of the 
debtor if it indicates the individual name of the debtor.
41
 
In addition, the amendments provide a new option—the “surname and 
first personal name of the debtor.”
42
 No middle name or middle initial is 
required or necessary.
43
 In theory, determining the debtor’s surname, also 
known as an individual’s last name or family name, should not be diffi-
cult. The secured party can simply ask the debtor her name or, as a safer 
option, determine the name by requiring that the debtor furnish mail ad-
dressed to the debtor or a copy of the debtor’s tax return. Determining the 
first name of the debtor might be more difficult. This requirement be-
                                                                                                                         
www.iaca.org/downloads/forms/ucc1.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2012) [hereinafter Form 
UCC-1]. 
33 U.C.C. § 9-503(b) (Alt. A). 
34 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
35 Id. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4)(A) (2002). 
40 See cases cited supra note 5. 
41 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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comes tangled in the web of nickname versus actual name. What is the 
“first personal name” of “Michael” who uses the name “Mike”? For most 
courts it is “Michael,” but he may respond “Mike” when asked.
44
 
The problems arising in determining an individual debtor’s name by 
using either the individual name or surname and first personal name likely 
contributed to the drafters’ decision to adopt the debtor’s driver’s license 
name as the first-tier requirement of section 9-503(a)(4) Alternative A.
45
 
Although mandating use of the driver’s license name does not solve all 
problems, it does provide a means for determining the name of an individ-
ual debtor that a secured party can use easily and which most debtors will 
be able to supply. 
II. EFFECTIVENESS OF A FINANCING STATEMENT THAT PROVIDES AN 
INCORRECT NAME OF THE DEBTOR 
The apparent goal of the financing statement name requirements is that 
the secured party strictly complies. Evidence of that is seen in the Article 9 
sections pertaining to financing statements: a financing statement that does 
not satisfy the name requirements of Article 9 is not effective.
46
 Neverthe-
less, a financing statement that fails to provide the correct name of the 
debtor is not completely without effect. Article 9 includes two sections 
that validate, in some instances, a financing statement that provides an 
incorrect name.
47
 Those sections are not, however, a panacea for an insuf-
                                                 
44 See In re Larsen, 2010 WL 909138, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Mar. 10, 2010) (ana-
lyzing security agreement by a Michael D. Larsen with listed name of “Mike Larsen”); In 
re Borden, 353 B.R. 886, 887 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2006) (analyzing security agreement by a 
Michael Borden with listed name of “Mike Borden”); In re Berry, 2006 WL 2795507 
(Bankr. D. Kan. Sept 26, 2006) (analyzing security agreement by a Michael R. Berry, Jr. 
with listed name of “Mike R. Berry, Jr.”); In re Erwin, 2003 WL 21513158 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. June 27, 2003) (analyzing security agreement by a Michael A. Erwin with listed 
name of “Mike Erwin”). 
45 American Bankers Association UCC Article 9 Working Group, supra note 19 (sup-
porting Alternative A); Clark, supra note 19 (supporting Alternative A). 
46 See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2002) (“Except as otherwise provided ... a financing state-
ment must be filed to perfect all security interests ....” ); U.C.C. § 9-502(a) (Approved 
Amendments 2010) (“[A] financing statement is sufficient only if it ... provides the name 
of the debtor ....”); id. § 9-506(b) (“[A] financing statement that fails sufficiently to 
provide the name of the debtor in accordance with section 9-503(a) is seriously mislead-
ing.”). 
47 Id. § 9-506(c) (validating a financing statement that incorrectly provides the deb-
tor’s name); id. § 9-507(c) (a filed financing statement remains effective after name it 
provides becomes seriously misleading). 
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ficient financing statement. A secured party must be diligent in satisfying 
the debtor’s name requirements. 
A. Section 9-506(c)—A Search Discloses the Financing Statement 
Section 9-506(c) provides relief for some financing statements that do 
not satisfy the name requirements of section 9-503(a).
48
 Unfortunately, it 
provides a cure in limited situations only.
49
 Initially, section 9-506(b) 
adopts a severe rule that a financing statement is seriously misleading if it 
fails to provide the name of the debtor as required by section 9-503(a).
50
 A 
financing statement that is seriously misleading is not effective to perfect a 
security interest.
51
 However, section 9-506(c) is an exception to the rule of 
section 9-506(b),
52
 which lessens the severity of section 9-506(b) by, in 
some cases, transforming a financing statement that is seriously mislead-
ing into one that is not seriously misleading,
53
 provided certain criteria are 
fulfilled. 
The rule of section 9-506(c) is simple, but lacking in detail. A filed fi-
nancing statement that does not satisfy the debtor’s name requirement 
nevertheless is not seriously misleading if a search under the correct name 
of the debtor, using the standard search logic of the filing office, would 
disclose the financing statement.
54
 Simple enough—the financing state-
ment is not seriously misleading if the search discloses it regardless of the 
fact that it does not sufficiently provide the debtor’s name.
55
 
But what is “standard search logic”? Although Article 9 offers no de-
tail on its meaning, the International Association of Commercial Adminis-
trators (IACA) has promulgated model rules for standard search logic.
56
 
Basically, standard search logic is the search methodology that a filing 
office applies when it conducts a search of its filing records for financing 
                                                 
48 Id. § 9-506(c). 
49 Id. 
50 “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a financing statement that fails 
sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in accordance with Section 9-503(a) is 
seriously misleading.” U.C.C. § 9-506(b). 
51 See supra note 46. 
52 U.C.C. § 9-506(c). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. The search is performed in the records of the office where the financing state-
ment is filed. Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’RS (IACA), UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 
ARTICLE 9; MODEL ADMINISTRATIVE RULES §§ 100–505 (2010), available at http:// 
www.iaca.org/downloads/2010Conference/STS/v14-2010_Model_Administrative_Rules.
pdf [hereinafter IACA MODEL RULES]. 
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statements filed against a debtor.
57
 Search methodology rules cover as-
pects of the debtor’s name such as punctuation, upper and lower case 
letters, accent marks, abbreviations, and number of matches returned.
58
 
Searches conducted by filing offices that implement and apply standard 
search logic produce uniform results because human judgment is not a 
factor in the search.
59
 States can adopt the IACA rules or create rules of 
their own.
60
 
To illustrate section 9-506(c), assume the debtor’s correct name under 
section 9-503(a)(4) Alternative A is “Michael R. Borden.”
61
 The secured 
party files a financing statement providing the debtor’s name as “Mike 
Borden,” because that is the name the debtor gives to the secured party, so 
on its face, the financing statement is seriously misleading for failing to 
comply with the name requirement of section 9-503(a)(4).
62
 However, 
section 9-506(c) makes the financing statement not seriously misleading if 
a search of the financing statement records under the correct name of the 
debtor using the standard search logic of the filing office would disclose 
the filed financing statement.
63
 A standard search logic search would not 
save this financing statement unless the filing office’s standard search 
logic retrieves all financing statements filed under “Borden” whose first 
personal name begins with the letter “M.” It is unlikely that any filing 
office has adopted such search logic.
64
 A search of “Michael Borden” 
using the model standard search logic would retrieve a financing statement 
providing the initial “M,” but not a financing statement providing another 
name that begins with “M.”
65
 This hypothetical demonstrates the limited 
ability of section 9-506(c) to save a financing statement that provides an 
incorrect name. 
                                                 
57 Id. § 501.4. 
58 Id. § 503.1. 
59 Id. § 503. 
60 The IACA webpage has links to the rules of each state. Model Administrative Rules 
for UCC Article 9, INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’RS, http://www.iaca.org/node/46 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2012) [hereinafter Model Administrative Rules]. 
61 The correct name is the driver’s license name for states enacting Alternative A to 
section 9-503. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
62 Id. § 9-506(b). 
63 Id. § 9-506(c). 
64 For the IACA webpage with links to the rules of each state, see supra note 60. 
65 See IACA MODEL RULES, supra note 56, § 503.1.8. 
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B. Section 9-507(c)—Financing Statement that Becomes Insufficient Re-
mains Effective 
Section 9-507(c) pertains to the situation in which the name of the deb-
tor on a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading.
66
 It oper-
ates whenever the debtor’s name provided on a filed financing statement 
becomes insufficient, causing the financing statement to become seriously 
misleading.
67
 A filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading 
when it does not provide the name of the debtor as required by section 
9-503(a)(4), regardless of the reason why the name becomes insufficient.
68
 
For example, insufficiency of the debtor’s name could result from a name 
change of the debtor, the expiration of the debtor’s driver’s license, or the 
issuance of multiple unexpired licenses by the governing jurisdiction.
69
 
Nevertheless, under section 9-507(c)(1), the financing statement remains 
effective to perfect the security interest in collateral that the debtor ac-
quired before and within four months after the filed financing statement 
becomes seriously misleading.
70
 No action need be taken by the secured 
party to continue that perfection.
71
 
To illustrate section 9-507(c)(1), assume the debtor is a sole proprietor 
whose full individual name is “Lucille Jennifer Koch,” and the collateral 
                                                 
66 The operation of section 9-507(c) presumes that the filed financing statement suffi-
ciently provides the name of the debtor. U.C.C. § 9-507(c) (“[T]he name that a filed 
financing statement provides for a debtor becomes insufficient as the name of the debtor 
....”) (emphasis added). 
67 Section 9-507(c) provides relief much more frequently than section 9-506(c) be-
cause many common occurrences cause the name on a filed financing statement to be-
come seriously misleading. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
68 The section was amended in the 2010 amendments to Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-507 
(Approved Amendments 2010). Previously, it applied when the debtor changed its name 
so that a filed financing statement became seriously misleading. U.C.C. § 9-507(c) 
(2002). The amendments make the section applicable to the situation in which the name 
on a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading, not only when the debtor 
changes its name. U.C.C. § 9-507(c) (Approved Amendments 2010). The section applies 
to all debtors, not only an individual debtor. 
69 These situations are discussed in Questions 13–17. See infra Part III. 
70 U.C.C. § 9-507(c)(1) (Approved Amendments 2010). Although the continued per-
fection established by section 9-507(c)(1) is phrased as “or” (“effective to perfect a 
security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor before, or within four months after 
....”) (emphasis added) there is no logical reason to interpret “or” as indicating an alterna-
tive between existing collateral and after-acquired collateral. Id. The section uses “or” but 
the meaning must be “and.” If the financing statement remains effective, it must be 
effective for existing collateral as well as for collateral the debtor acquires within four 
months after the seriously misleading event. Cf. id. § 9-508(b)(2). 
71 Id. § 9-507(c). 
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for the security interest is the debtor’s existing and after-acquired invento-
ry. The secured party filed a financing statement that provides the name as 
indicated on the debtor’s driver’s license, “Jen Koch.”
72
 When her driver’s 
license expires on December 31, 2013, the debtor neglects to obtain a new 
driver’s license and, because there is no unexpired driver’s license, section 
9-503(a)(5) applies and fixes the name of the debtor as either “Lucille 
Jennifer Koch” or “Lucille Koch.”
73
 That change causes the financing 
statement to become seriously misleading on that date unless a standard 
search logic search would disclose the filed financing statement.
74
 Never-
theless, under section 9-507(c)(1) the financing statement remains effec-
tive to perfect the security interest in all inventory the debtor had before 
the financing statement became seriously misleading and all inventory the 
debtor acquires within four months after it became seriously misleading.
75
 
Thus, the security interest is perfected in all inventory the debtor possesses 
as of April 30, 2014 (four months after the financing statement became 
seriously misleading). The security interest remains perfected in such 
collateral until perfection would otherwise lapse.
76
 
Section 9-507(c)(1) offers significant protection for a secured party. 
Events that can cause the name on a filed financing statement to become 
seriously misleading are common and likely to occur without the know-
ledge of the secured party.
77
 Regardless of whether the secured party is 
negligent, neglectful, or without fault for not discovering the event, losing 
                                                 
72 The name of the debtor indicated on the debtor’s driver’s license could be different 
from the debtor’s individual name because the name on the documentation that a jurisdic-
tion requires to issue a driver’s license might not be identical to the debtor’s individual 
name. Because the governing jurisdiction has enacted section 9-503(a)(4) Alternative A, 
the financing statement must provide the name as indicated on the debtor’s driver’s 
license, regardless of whether it is the same as the debtor’s individual name. Id. 
§ 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
73 The correct name of the debtor is either her individual name or her surname and 
first personal name. Id. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A). 
74 U.C.C. § 9-506(b)–(c). The discrepancy between the names makes it highly unlike-
ly that a standard search logic search under the correct name would retrieve the filed 
financing statement. 
75 Id. § 507(c)(1). 
76 For most security interests perfected by filing, the period of effectiveness of a fi-
nancing statement, and consequently the period of perfection of the security interest, is 
five years from the date of filing. Id. § 9-515(a), (c). Filing an effective continuation 
statement can extend the life of a financing statement for an additional five years. Id. 
§ 9-515(e). 
77 A name change of the debtor, the expiration of the debtor’s driver’s license, or is-
suance of multiple licenses to the debtor by the governing jurisdiction can all cause the 
name on a filed financing statement to become seriously misleading. Id. § 506(b). The 
secured party has no way of knowing if these events occur. 
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perfection of its security interest would be an unforgiving penalty. Anoth-
er secured party that extends credit based on the debtor’s correct name 
would prefer its competitor’s loss of perfection, but that secured party is 
likely in a better position to discover the various names that the debtor 
uses or previously used, simply by asking during the credit application 
process. 
The protection of section 9-507(c) is not without limits—not all colla-
teral will be automatically protected. To perfect the security interest in any 
collateral the debtor acquires more than four months after the financing 
statement becomes seriously misleading, the secured party must amend the 
financing statement within that four month period to sufficiently provide 
the name of the debtor.
78
 The amendment must provide the name in accor-
dance with the applicable “only if” rule—either section 9-503(a)(4) or 
(a)(5).
79
 Filing an amendment that sufficiently provides the name of the 
debtor perfects the security interest in all collateral, without any gap in 
perfection.
80
 Using the names of the hypothetical discussed above, the 
amendment must provide the name “Lucille Jennifer Koch” or “Lucille 
Koch.” 
In limiting the automatic perfection of the security interest to collateral 
the debtor has or acquires up to four months after the financing statement 
becomes seriously misleading, the drafters give the secured party four 
months to discover that the financing statement has become seriously 
misleading and to take remedial action.
81
 This rule provides some protec-
tion for the secured party that extends credit based on the debtor’s current 
correct name and adds a diligence requirement for the secured party whose 
filed financing statement became seriously misleading.
82
 
A secured party that fails to amend the financing statement will not be 
perfected in collateral the debtor acquires more than four months after the 
financing statement becomes seriously misleading.
83
 Although the security 
interest will attach to that collateral, provided the security agreement in-
cludes an after-acquired property clause, the filed financing statement will 
not perfect it.
84
 For example, assume the financing statement becomes 
                                                 
78 Id. § 9-507(c)(2). A financing statement is amended in accordance with section 
9-512. U.C.C. § 9-512. Section 9-509(b) authorizes the secured party to file an amend-
ment to the financing statement. Id. § 9-509(b). 
79 Id. § 503(a)(4), (5) (Alt. A). 
80 Id. § 9-507(c)(2). 
81 Id. § 9-507(c). 
82 Id. 
83 U.C.C. § 9-507(c)(2). 
84 U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (2002) (validating an after-acquired property clause). 
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seriously misleading on December 31, 2013. The secured party has not 
filed an amendment to the financing statement. Because the security 
agreement includes an after-acquired property clause, the security interest 
attaches to collateral the debtor acquires on May 12, 2014, but the security 
interest in that collateral is no longer perfected because the four-month 
safe harbor ended on April 31, 2014. However, failing to file an amend-
ment has no effect on perfection of the security interest in collateral the 
debtor acquired before the end of the four-month period. 
A secured party that fails to timely file an amendment can file it as 
soon as the secured party discovers that the financing statement has be-
come seriously misleading, regardless that the discovery occurs outside 
the four-month period.
85
 If filed within the four-month grace period, an 
amendment that makes the financing statement not seriously misleading 
will perfect the security interest in all collateral, whenever acquired.
86
 
However, if the financing statement is amended after the grace period, the 
security interest in collateral acquired after the grace period is perfected 
only from the date of filing the amendment.
87
 Continuing with the pre-
vious example, if the secured party files an amendment on June 1, 2014, 
the financing statement will perfect collateral the debtor acquired on May 
12, 2014. However, because the four-month grace period expired, the 
amendment is effective only from the time of its filing, and there is a gap 
in perfection for any collateral acquired between the end of the four-month 
period and the filing of the amendment.
88
 As a result of the gap, the colla-
teral acquired on May 12 has a priority of June 1.
89
 The security interest in 
the “gap” collateral likely would be subordinate to another security inter-
est perfected before or during the gap period.
90
 
III. TWENTY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE NAME OF THE DEBTOR 
The following twenty questions involve pre-filing and post-filing is-
sues. Questions 1 through 11 discuss questions that can arise when a se-
                                                 
85 See U.C.C. § 9-507 cmt. 4 (Approved Amendments 2010) (noting that a secured 
party may file an amendment either before or after the expiration of the four-month grace 
period). 
86 See id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. § 9-507 cmt. 4; Id. § 9-512(c). 
89 Id. § 9-322(a)(1). 
90 Section 9-322(a), the general priority rule of Article 9, awards priority to the securi-
ty interest with the earlier time of filing or perfection. U.C.C. § 9-322(a). For any “gap” 
collateral, priority would go to the first security interest to file or perfect during that 
period. Id. 
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cured party is determining the appropriate name to provide on the financ-
ing statement and how to provide it. Question 12 provides guidance on the 
debtor’s name a secured party searches under in a standard search logic 
search
91
 of the financing statement records. Questions 13 through 20 ad-
dress events that affect the sufficiency of the debtor’s name on a filed 
financing statement, and consequently the perfection of the security inter-
est. 
A. Questions 
1. What if “this State” Has Not Issued the Debtor a Driver’s License? 
Suppose the debtor does not have a driver’s license. The “only if” rule 
of section 9-503(a)(4) may nevertheless control sufficiency of the debtor’s 
name. If “this State” (the jurisdiction that governs perfection) is a state in 
which the same agency that issues a driver’s license also issues an identi-
fication card to an individual as an alternative to a driver’s license and the 
section 9-503(a)(4) of the governing jurisdiction includes both documents 
in the “only if” rule, then the financing statement is sufficient as to the 
debtor’s name only if it provides the name as it is indicated on the identifi-
cation card.
92
 
If the section 9-503(a)(4) of the governing jurisdiction does not in-
clude identification cards and the state has not issued a driver’s license, 
then section 9-503(a)(5) supplies the requirements for sufficiency of the 
debtor’s name.
93
 In that case, the financing statement is sufficient only if it 
provides the individual name of the debtor or the surname and first per-
sonal name of the debtor.
94
 This rule, examined in Part I, requires the 
secured party to ascertain one of those two names of the debtor and place 
it on the financing statement;
95
 either name is sufficient.
96
 
                                                 
91 A “standard search logic search” under section 9-506(c) is explained supra Part 
II.A. 
92 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). The uniform section 9-503(a)(4), Alternative A plac-
es brackets around “driver’s license” so that a state can provide appropriate terminology 
if it adopts the identification card option. Id. § 9-503 legis. n.3. 
93 Section 9-503(a)(5) applies “if the debtor is an individual to whom paragraph (4) 
does not apply.” Id. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A). Subsection (a)(4) does not apply because the 
governing jurisdiction has not issued a driver’s license or identification card. 
94 Id. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A), as discussed supra Part I. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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2. What if “this State” Has Not Issued the Debtor a Driver’s License 
or an Identification Card? 
Assume that, although the section 9-503(a)(4) of the governing juris-
diction includes identification cards in its “only if” rule, the debtor has 
neither driver’s license nor identification card.
97
 Because that debtor is an 
“individual to whom paragraph [9-503(a)](4) does not apply,” section 
9-503(a)(5) governs the debtor’s name.
98
 Sufficiency of the debtor’s name 
under the “only if” rule of subsection (a)(5) requires that the financing 
statement provide the individual name of the debtor or the surname and 
first personal name of the debtor.
99
 
3. What if “this State” Has Issued the Debtor a Driver’s License and 
an Identification Card that Provide Different Names? 
Assume the section 9-503(a)(4) of the governing jurisdiction includes 
identification cards in its “only if” rule. The state issued the debtor an 
identification card in 2012 that indicates the name as “Beth Gannon.” The 
state issued her a driver’s license in 2014 that indicates the name as “Eliz-
abeth Gannon.”
100
 Neither document has expired. Which name is required 
for a sufficient financing statement? 
Section 9-503(g) resolves this name quandary. If the governing state 
has issued more than one unexpired driver’s license or identification card, 
the financing statement must provide the name on the document issued 
most recently.
101
 The “only if” rule—financing statement must provide 
name indicated on the applicable driver’s license or identification card—is 
subject to section 9-503(g), which requires use of the name on the most 
                                                 
97 Having neither form of identification would seem to be a rare situation for a debtor 
who is seeking secured credit, but is possible nevertheless. Perhaps a passport serves as 
the debtor’s identification. 
98 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A). 
99 Id. 
100 The feasibility of this situation depends on the state requirements for establishing 
the name of an individual on a driver’s license or identification card. To establish a name 
on a license or identification card, a state might require mail addressed to the debtor, a 
social security card, or a birth certificate. Each document could indicate the individual’s 
name differently. 
101 “If this state has issued to an individual more than one [driver’s license] of a kind 
described in subsection (a)(4), the one that was issued most recently is the one to which 
subsection (a)(4) refers.” U.C.C. § 9-503(g) (Alt. A). The brackets placed around “driv-
er’s license” allow states to substitute words that add an identification card to subsection 
(g). See id. § 9-503 legis. n.3. 
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recently issued document for sufficiency of the financing statement.
102
 In 
this situation the secured party should use “Elizabeth Gannon” on the 
financing statement. 
4. What if “this State” Has Issued the Debtor Multiple, Unexpired 
Driver’s Licenses? 
Suppose the debtor loses his unexpired driver’s license from “this 
State” and obtains a replacement driver’s license using a different name. 
For example, Henry Beams’ driver’s license indicates his name as “Henry 
Beams.” He loses that license and obtains a replacement that indicates his 
name as “Hank Beams.” Later he finds the lost license and now has two 
unexpired licenses.
103
 Should a filer indicate “Henry” or “Hank” on a 
financing statement? 
Because the state has issued more than one unexpired driver’s license, 
section 9-503(g) is the applicable rule.
104
 The financing statement is suffi-
cient as to the debtor’s name only if it indicates the name from the most 
recently issued license.
105
 “Hank Beams” is the name necessary for suffi-
ciency. 
5. What if Multiple States Have Issued the Debtor Unexpired Driver’s 
Licenses? 
Suppose the debtor spends December to April in Florida at her beach-
front condominium and April to December in Michigan at her lakeside 
cottage and consequently has unexpired driver’s licenses issued by both 
states. Her Michigan license indicates her name as “Florence M. Sheen” 
while her Florida license provides her name as “Mary Sheen.” A secured 
party takes a security interest in her personal art collection, housed in both 
locations. Which name should the secured party indicate on the financing 
statement? 
This question raises an issue of which jurisdiction’s Article 9 governs 
perfection of a security interest. The answer to that question determines 
which name is sufficient on a financing statement, because the amend-
ments to Article 9 do not change the choice-of-law rules with respect to 
                                                 
102 Id. § 9-503(a)(4), (g) (Alt. A). 
103 Because both licenses are unexpired, the hypothetical posed in the text has two 
driver’s licenses of a kind described in section 9-503(a)(4), and multiple licenses activate 
section 9-503(g). See id. § 9-503(g). See supra note 100 for the possibility of this situa-
tion. 
104 U.C.C. § 9-503(g) (Alt. A). 
105 Id. 
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individual debtors.
106
 Perfection of a non-possessory security interest in 
goods is governed by the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located.
107
 
Other types of collateral are subject to different choice-of-law rules.
108
 
Section 9-307(b)(1) provides that an individual debtor is located at the 
individual’s principal residence.
109
 Article 9 does not define “principal 
residence,” nor does the Official Comment provide guidance, but in most 
situations, the location of the principal residence should be clear.
110
 In 
close cases, the comment advises filing in each jurisdiction that could be 
the location of the principal residence.
111
 
In the hypothetical above, it seems the debtor’s principal residence is 
Michigan because she spends eight months of the year there, thus Michi-
gan law governs perfection of a security interest.
112
 The financing state-
ment should be filed in Michigan and indicate the debtor as “Florence M. 
Sheen” using the name on the Michigan license. The “only if” rule does 
not require an alternate filing in Michigan with the name “Mary Sheen.”
113
 
However, the Comment’s advice is sound and caution dictates filing 
another financing statement in Florida indicating “Mary Sheen,” the name 
indicated on the Florida license, as the debtor. 
                                                 
106 Compare U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)–307(b)(1) (2002), with U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)–
307(b)(1) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
107 U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (Approved Amendments 2010). Note that the jurisdiction go-
verning priority of a security interest can be different from that governing perfection. See 
id. § 9-301(3)(C). 
108 The governing law for a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title 
is the jurisdiction whose certificate of title covers the goods. U.C.C. § 9-303 (2002). The 
governing law for a security interest in a deposit account is the jurisdiction of the bank 
that maintains the account. Id. § 9-304(a). The governing law for a security interest in 
investment property depends on the type of investment property and the method of per-
fection. Id. § 9-305. The governing law for a security interest in a letter-of-credit right is 
the jurisdiction of the issuer or nominated person. Id. § 9-306. 
109 U.C.C. § 9-307(b)(1) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
110 Id. § 9-307 cmt. 2; see also LOL Fin. Co. v. Paul Johnson & Sons Cattle Co., 758 
F. Supp. 2d 871, 893 (D. Neb. 2010) (principal residence found where debtors had lived 
continuously in jurisdiction for fifteen years); In re Reel, 2005 WL 1668279, at *1 
(Bankr. D. Wyo. June 7, 2005) (principal residence found where debtor made purchase 
and subsequently resided in jurisdiction). 
111 U.C.C. § 9-307 cmt. 2. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
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6. What if “this State” Has Not Issued the Debtor a Driver’s License, 
but Another State Has Done so? 
Suppose the debtor moves from Missouri to Kansas, establishing his 
principal residence in Kansas. Missouri has issued an unexpired driver’s 
license to the debtor indicating the debtor’s name as “Randall N. Cham-
bers.” The debtor grants a security interest to a Kansas secured party, 
signing the security agreement as “Randy Chambers,” but has not obtained 
a Kansas driver’s license. Which name should the secured party provide 
on the financing statement? 
This scenario initially raises a choice-of-law issue. Because the deb-
tor’s principal residence is in Kansas, the Article 9 of Kansas governs 
perfection of the security interest,
114
 making Kansas “this State.” The fact 
that Missouri has issued an unexpired license is irrelevant for two reasons. 
First, the Article 9 of Missouri does not govern perfection.
115
 Second, this 
is not a situation where the governing law changes while there is a per-
fected security interest because the debtor did not grant a security interest 
during the time when his principal residence was Missouri.
116
 
After determining the governing law, the secured party can deal with 
the issue of the debtor’s name. Section 9-503(a)(4) does not apply because 
Kansas has not issued a driver’s license.
117
 Thus, the “only if” rule of 
section 9-503(a)(5) governs. The financing statement is sufficient only if it 
provides the individual name of the debtor or the surname and first per-
sonal name of the debtor.
118
 Once again the secured party must ascertain 
one of those two names of the debtor and place it on the financing state-
ment. The Missouri driver’s license is evidence of the debtor’s name and 
might be the name the secured party chooses to provide on the financing 
statement. Whether it is sufficient depends on its being the debtor’s indi-
vidual name or surname and first personal name. 
                                                 
114 The Article 9 of Kansas governs under the rules of 9-301(1) and 9-307(b)(1). 
115 See U.C.C. § 9-307(b)(1). 
116 Id. § 9-316(a) would have continued perfection of a security interest that was per-
fected before the governing jurisdiction changed. See infra Question 18. 
117 Application of the “only if” rule of section 9-503(a)(4) depends on “this State” 
having issued a driver’s license that has not expired. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
118 Id. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A). 
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7. What if the Name on the Debtor’s Unexpired License Differs from 
Her Individual Name? 
Assume that debtor informs secured party that her name is Judith H. 
McCormack. Secured party examines debtor’s unexpired driver’s license, 
which indicates debtor’s name as “Judy McCormack.” Upon further inves-
tigation, secured party determines that debtor’s name is Judith H. McCor-
mack. Which name should secured party place on the financing statement? 
The “only if” rule of section 9-503(a)(4) controls sufficiency of the 
debtor’s name.
119
 There is only one name that is sufficient—the name as 
indicated on the debtor’s driver’s license.
120
 It is the only name that is 
sufficient, even though the driver’s license name is not the correct name of 
the individual.
121
 The financing statement must provide the name as “Judy 
McCormack.” 
The driver’s-license-name-only rule applies regardless of the reason 
for the difference in name.
122
 Suppose the name of the debtor is misspelled 
on the driver’s license—actual name “Judith,” driver’s license name 
“Judth”—missing the letter “i.” To accomplish sufficiency, the financing 
statement must indicate the name as “Judth.” That is the name on the driv-
er’s license and section 9-503(a)(4) mandates its use.
123
 A secured party 
must resist the temptation to use the debtor’s correct name. The “only if” 
rule of section 9-503(a)(4) authorizes only one name for sufficiency—the 
name on the unexpired driver’s license.
124
 A cautious secured party might 
file a financing statement that lists all the debtor’s names, but the only 
name necessary is the name on the unexpired driver’s license. 
In any situation where the driver’s license name differs from the deb-
tor’s individual name, the secured party may want to file separate financ-
ing statements under the various names of the debtor or list multiple 
names of the debtor on the financing statement.
125
 Nevertheless, the rule 
of section 9-503(a)(4) is clear for a court to apply—the only name neces-
                                                 
119 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
120 Recall that the name on an identification card could supply sufficiency if the appli-
cable section 9-503(a)(4) includes identification cards. See supra Question 1. 
121 Article 9 does not determine the “individual name” of the debtor, nor does it pro-
vide any guidance on determining such name. U.C.C. § 9-503 cmt. 2d. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
124 Id. 
125 Section 9-509 authorizes the secured party to file records necessary to perfect the 
security interest. Id. § 9-509. Section 9-503(e) authorizes the secured party to provide 
multiple names on the financing statement. Id. § 9-503(e). 
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sary for sufficiency of an individual debtor’s name is the name as indi-
cated on the debtor’s driver’s license.
126
 
8. What if the Driver’s License Provides a Suffix to the Debtor’s 
Name? 
The debtor’s driver’s license indicates the name as “Ken Griffey, Jr.” 
Does a sufficient financing statement require “Jr.”? If the name on the 
unexpired driver’s license adds “Jr.,” that suffix is part of the debtor’s 
name and the financing statement must provide it.
127
 Both the current and 
the draft Form UCC-1 include a space to provide a suffix.
128
 
Other suffixes can indicate status. Suppose the debtor’s driver’s li-
cense indicates the name as “Kristen Price, MD.” If the suffix is provided 
on the driver’s license as part of the name, its inclusion is necessary for 
sufficiency of the financing statement.
129
 The secured party should provide 
“MD” in the “suffix” field on the financing statement. Entering “Kristen 
Price” in the “additional debtor” space on the financing statement seems 
warranted in this situation.
130
 
9. What Surname Issues Might Arise? 
States may vary in the order in which they list the debtor’s name on a 
driver’s license. A license could first list the surname or the first personal 
name of the debtor. The secured party must know the order in which the 
debtor’s name appears on the driver’s license because it must enter the 
appropriate name in the space on the financing statement designated for 
that name.
131
 The financing statement will not be sufficient unless the 
parts of the debtor’s name are placed in the appropriate space on the fi-
nancing statement.
132
 
                                                 
126 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
127 See id. § 9-503 cmt. 2d; see also UCC Financing Statement Addendum (Form 
UCC1Ad), INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’RS, http://www.iaca.org/downloads/forms 
/UCC1AD.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2012) [hereinafter Form UCC-1Ad]. 
128 U.C.C. § 9-521(a); Form UCC-1, supra note 32; UCC Financing Statement (2013) 
(Approved), INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’RS, http://www.iaca.org/downloads/2011 
Conference/STS/04.02UCC1(2013).pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2012) [hereinafter 2013 
Approved UCC-1]. 
129 See U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
130 Section 9-503(e) authorizes entry of multiple debtor and secured party names on a 
financing statement. Id. § 9-503(e); see also Form UCC-1Ad, supra note 127. 
131 See U.C.C. § 9-503 cmt. 2d. 
132 See All Bus. Corp. v. Choi, 634 S.E. 2d 400, 404 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (illustrating 
the problems caused by misplaced names). 
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This problem can be made more difficult when the license includes 
three names, two of which could be surnames. For example, if the debtor’s 
driver’s license reads “Rosalie Lopez Garcia,” the secured party must 
ascertain whether the surname is “Lopez” or “Garcia.”
133
 
A secured party must also be careful with a surname that includes a 
hyphen. If the driver’s license indicates the debtor’s surname is hyphe-
nated, the financing statement must include that name in the surname 
space.
134
 
10. What if the Debtor’s Name on the Mortgage Record Is Used as the 
Financing Statement? 
Article 9 allows a record of a mortgage to operate as the financing 
statement filed as a fixture filing.
135
 The mortgage record must satisfy the 
general requirements of a sufficient financing statement in addition to 
specific requirements relating to a fixture filing.
136
 In a jurisdiction that 
enacts the “only if” requirement of Alternative A, should the secured party 
provide the debtor’s driver’s license name on the mortgage record? 
A secured party logically would assume that the mortgage must pro-
vide the debtor’s driver’s license name because that is the only name suf-
ficient under Alternative A.
137
 However, that is not the rule the drafters 
adopted. Instead, a mortgage record is effective as a financing statement if 
the record provides the “individual name” of the debtor or the “surname 
and first personal name” of the debtor.
138
 This is virtually identical to the 
“only if” rule of section 9-503(a)(5),
139
 which applies when the governing 
                                                 
133 See Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. Frozsun Foods, 143 Cal. App. 4th 319, 322–
25 (2006) (highlighting the issues with multiple potential surnames). If there is a question 
regarding multiple surnames, both names should be included in the financing statements. 
Id. at 325. The approved financing statement form UCC-1 includes a space for “addition-
al name(s)/initial(s).” 2013 Approved UCC-1, supra note 128. 
134 See U.C.C. § 9-503 cmt. 2d (Approved Amendments 2010). 
135 Id. § 9-502(c). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). As noted in Part I, the financing statement must provide 
the name indicated on the driver’s license if the governing jurisdiction has issued an 
unexpired driver’s license. See supra Part I. 
138 U.C.C. § 9-502(c)(3)(B). 
139 The difference between section 9-503(a)(5) and section 9-502(c)(3)(B) is that sec-
tion 9-503(a)(5) reads “only if,” followed by the name requirements, while section 
9-502(c)(3)(B) reads “if,” followed by the name requirements. Compare id. 
§ 9-503(a)(5), with id. § 9-502(c)(3)(B). It seems unlikely that the omission signifies an 
important difference. 
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jurisdiction has not issued an unexpired driver’s license.
140
 The drafters 
did not indicate why they chose not to authorize use of the driver’s license 
name. Regardless of their rationale, the financing statement must provide 
the debtor’s individual name or the debtor’s surname and first personal 
name to satisfy the name requirement
141
—either name suffices.
142
 The 
debtor’s driver’s license name is sufficient for the mortgage record if it 
matches the debtor’s individual name or the surname and first personal 
name.
143
 
11. What Data Field Issues Might Be Encountered? 
Data field issues provide a problem a secured party never wants to en-
counter.
144
 Suppose the name on the driver’s license includes a special 
character, which the filing office cannot process, for example “~,” a tilde, 
or the name on the driver’s license exceeds the data field size capability of 
the filing office. What happens next? 
Optimistically, the legislatures adopting Alternative A have heeded the 
advice of the drafters of the Article 9 amendments and have determined 
whether such issues exist and resolved them before enactment of Alterna-
tive A.
145
 Regardless, it is the responsibility of the secured party to ensure 
that the filed financing statement mirrors the driver’s license name.
146
 
Compliance could require that the secured party file a tangible financing 
statement to secure consistency between the names. A secured party can 
facilitate consistency by searching the financing statement index under the 
debtor’s name after filing its financing statement and checking the infor-
mation indicated on the record retrieved against the information on the 
financing statement the secured party submitted. The secured party should 
resolve any discrepancy between the records with the filing office. 
A secured party that complies with Article 9’s filing requirements 
receives protection from section 9-516(a). Section 9-516(a) provides that 
                                                 
140 See supra Part I (discussing section 9-503(a)(5)). 
141 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. § 9-502(c)(3). 
144 The data field issues would arise predominantly in electronic filing situations. 
145 In the Legislative Notes to section 9-503, the drafters raise these issues and advise 
the states to “make certain that such issues have been resolved.” U.C.C. § 9-503 legis. 
n.2. These issues can arise in jurisdictions that have adopted Alternative B, but they are 
not as troublesome because the financing statement can sufficiently provide the debtor’s 
name in any of three ways under the safe harbor rule of Alternative B. Id. § 9-503(a)(4) 
(Alt. B). 
146 Id. § 9-506 cmt. 2. 
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“communication”
147
 of a sufficient financing statement to the filing office 
with tender of the filing fee “constitutes filing.”
148
 Thus, a financing 
statement is filed when the secured party fulfills those requirements, re-
gardless of what the filing office does with the financing statement or how 
the filing office enters it into the filing index.
149
 The key for the filer is to 
correctly enter the debtor’s name on the financing statement, having re-
gard for any problems with the data field limitations of the filing office.
150
 
Taking that action initiates the protection of section 9-516(a).
151
 
12. What Search Issues Should Be Considered? 
Suppose a debtor uses various names: “Becky Johnson,” “Rebecca L. 
Johnson,” and “Becca Johnson.” Her driver’s license indicates her name as 
“Becky Johnson” and that is the only name she has used on her driver’s 
licenses.
152
 A potential secured creditor wants to know the existence of 
any filings against her since they would indicate the possibility of a securi-
ty interest.
153
 In which names should the secured party search? 
Because “this State” has enacted Alternative A, the only sufficient 
name for the financing statement is “Becky Johnson.”
154
 A financing 
statement that provides only a different name is seriously misleading un-
                                                 
147 “Communicate” includes sending a tangible record or electronically sending a 
record to a filing office that accepts filings made in that manner. Id. § 9-102(a)(18). 
148 Id. § 9-516(a). 
149 U.C.C. § 9-517 (2002) (“The failure of the filing office to index a record correctly 
does not affect the effectiveness of the filed record.”). 
150 U.C.C. § 9-516(a) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
151 Id. 
152 The facts of Question 12 are limited to the situation in which the debtor has used 
the same name for all her driver’s licenses. Question 19 discusses the priority issue 
created if a filed financing statement provides a sufficient name from a previous driver’s 
license but that name is different from the name on the current license. See infra Question 
19. 
153 A filed financing statement does not guarantee that the security interest is per-
fected. Perfection requires that the secured party fulfill all attachment and perfection 
requirements. U.C.C. § 9-308(a) (2002). However, the filing date can fix the priority of a 
security interest and a potential secured creditor would be interested in that information. 
See U.C.C. § 9-322(a) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
154 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
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less a standard search logic search would disclose it.
155
 Thus, an interested 
creditor should search “Becky Johnson.”
156
 
The search logic rule of section 9-506(c) does not necessitate search-
ing under other names.
157
 That rule validates a financing statement that 
would be disclosed through a search using the debtor’s correct name.
158
 
Any financing statement retrieved through a search under “Becky John-
son” would not be seriously misleading. Thus, searching in the names of 
“Becca Johnson” or “Rebecca L. Johnson” is not necessary to find suffi-
cient financing statements. 
Beyond the desire to discover sufficient financing statements filed 
against a debtor, a potential secured party might want to know the com-
plete secured debt position of the debtor.
159
 To gain that knowledge, the 
secured party should search all possible names of the debtor. Retrieving a 
filed financing statement that provides an incorrect, seriously misleading 
debtor’s name does not jeopardize the priority position of the security 
interest because the security interest coupled to that financing statement is 
unperfected and a perfected security interest has priority over an unper-
fected security interest.
160
 Knowledge of a prior, unperfected security 
interest does not affect the priority of a perfected security interest.
161
 It 
does, however, provide a creditor with knowledge of other debts and a 
potential secured party may wish to search other names of the debtor for 
that reason. 
                                                 
155 Id. § 9-506(b)–(c). A financing statement that provides additional names for the 
debtor can be effective, even if those names are incorrect, if it also provides the correct 
name. Id. § 9-503(a)(4), (e). 
156 If the jurisdiction whose law governs the security interest has changed, searches 
under other names of the debtor are warranted because a security interest perfected under 
the law of the previously applicable jurisdiction remains perfected under section 9-316(a) 
for a limited period of time. Id. § 9-316(a). Question 18 provides a more complete discus-
sion of such a situation. See infra Question 18. 
157 See U.C.C. § 9-506(c). 
158 See supra Part II.A (discussing rule 9-506(c)). 
159 A security interest that has attached but is not perfected is “effective according to 
its terms.” U.C.C. § 9-201(a) (2002). A filed financing statement that does not provide a 
sufficient name of the debtor cannot perfect a security interest unless the financing state-
ment is not seriously misleading under the search logic rule of section 9-506(c). U.C.C. 
§ 9-506(c) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
160 Id. § 9-322(a)(2). 
161 The rule of section 9-322(a) bases priority on time of filing or perfection. Know-
ledge, notice, or the lack of either are not factors. See id. § 9-322(a); id. § 9-322 cmt. 4. 
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13. What Happens if the Debtor’s Driver’s License Expires while the 
Debt Remains Unpaid? 
A secured party that correctly provides the debtor’s driver’s license 
name on the financing statement satisfies the sufficiency requirement for 
the debtor’s name,
162
 but what happens when the debtor’s driver’s license 
expires and the debtor neglects to renew the license?
163
 
Section 9-503(a)(4) does not control this issue because there is no 
longer an unexpired driver’s license.
164
 Subsection (a)(5) provides the 
name requirement.
165
 A sufficient name is now either the individual name 
of the debtor or the surname and first personal name of the debtor.
166
 The 
expiration of the driver’s license creates no problems if the name of the 
debtor on the driver’s license is the same as either of the names that are 
sufficient under subsection (a)(5).
167
 If so, the financing statement still 
sufficiently indicates the name of the debtor and the security interest re-
mains perfected, assuming all other perfection requirements are satisfied. 
The problem for the secured party arises if the driver’s license name, 
although correctly provided on the filed financing statement, differs signif-
icantly from the names that are sufficient under subsection (a)(5).
168
 A 
financing statement is seriously misleading if it “fails sufficiently” to pro-
vide the name of the debtor in accordance with section 9-503(a),
169
 and a 
security interest is not perfected if the financing statement is seriously 
misleading.
170
 Although the search logic rule of section 9-506(c) can vali-
date a financing statement and thus save perfection of the security interest, 
                                                 
162 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
163 State law controls the duration of a driver’s license. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. 
§ 186.412(7)(d) (West 2011) (Kentucky law requiring driver’s license renewal every four 
years). 
164 Section 9-503(a)(4) applies when “this State” has issued an unexpired driver’s li-
cense or, if applicable, an identification card. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
165 Id. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 The difference could result from a variance between the driver’s license name and 
the section 9-503(a)(5) names, or from the debtor changing his name. 
169 Section 9-506(b) establishes the rule that a financing statement that “fails suffi-
ciently” to provide the name of the debtor in accordance with section 9-503(a) is serious-
ly misleading, unless saved by the search logic rule of section 9-506(c). U.C.C. 
§ 9-506(b). 
170 See supra note 46. 
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such result is unlikely if there is a significant difference between the 
names.
171
 
Section 9-507(c), however, provides partial protection for the security 
interest in this case.
172
 It makes the financing statement effective for colla-
teral the debtor acquired before and within four months after the filed 
financing statement becomes seriously misleading.
173
 To perfect the secu-
rity interest in collateral the debtor acquires more than four months after 
the financing statement becomes seriously misleading, the secured party 
must amend the financing statement to provide sufficiently the name of 
the debtor within that four-month period.
174
 
14. What if the Debtor’s Driver’s License Expires and “this State” Is-
sues Him a New License with Different Name? 
The debtor, Robert Allen Zimmerman, legally changes his name to 
“Bob Dylan.” When his driver’s license expires, he renews it and is issued 
a license indicating his name as “Bob Dylan.” The filed financing state-
ment indicates the debtor’s name as “Robert Allen Zimmerman.” Is the 
debtor’s name sufficiently indicated on the financing statement?
175
 No, but 
the financing statement is partially effective regardless of the insufficient 
name. 
Section 9-503(a)(4) governs the sufficiency of the debtor’s name be-
cause “this State” has issued an unexpired driver’s license.
176
 Section 
9-503(a)(4) requires that the financing statement provide the name on the 
unexpired driver’s license, “Bob Dylan.”
177
 The financing statement does 
not sufficiently provide the name of the debtor because it indicates the 
name of the debtor as “Robert Allen Zimmerman.” That error in the deb-
                                                 
171 A financing statement that does not indicate sufficiently the name of the debtor is 
not seriously misleading if a search under the debtor’s correct name using the filing 
office’s standard search logic would disclose the financing statement. See supra Part II.A 
(discussing section 9-506(c)). 
172 See supra Part II.B (discussing section 9-507(c)). 
173 U.C.C. § 9-507(c)(1) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
174 Id. § 9-507(c)(2). A financing statement is amended in accordance with section 
9-512. 
175 This issue arises if the current driver’s license provides a name different from that 
of the expired license, regardless of the reason. Note that a filed financing statement 
remains sufficient under section 9-503(a)(4), Alternative A, regardless of the name 
change, until a new driver’s license is issued. See infra Question 15. 
176 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
177 Id. 
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tor’s name makes the financing statement seriously misleading, and that 
affects perfection of the security interest.
178
 
Happily, section 9-507(c) again performs a partial rescue.
179
 The fi-
nancing statement continues to be effective and the security interest re-
mains perfected for all collateral acquired by the debtor until four months 
after the financing statement becomes seriously misleading.
180
 To perfect 
the security interest in collateral the debtor acquires thereafter, the secured 
party must amend the financing statement to provide a sufficient name for 
the debtor.
181
 
15. What if the Debtor Changes Her Name, and “this State” Does Not 
Issue Her a New Driver’s License? 
Suppose the debtor, Stefani Germanotta, legally changes her name to 
“Lady Gaga.” She does not, however, apply for a new driver’s license and 
her driver’s license provides her name as “Stefani Germanotta.” The filed 
financing statement likewise indicates the debtor as “Stefani Germanotta.” 
Must the secured party take action to preserve perfection of the security 
interest? No, the security interest remains perfected until the license ex-
pires or a new license is issued.
182
 
Section 9-503(a)(4) controls the debtor’s name because “this State” 
has issued an unexpired driver’s license.
183
 Sufficiency of the debtor’s 
name requires that the financing statement provide the name as indicated 
on the unexpired license.
184
 The name on the driver’s license is “Stefani 
Germanotta.” The name provided on the filed financing statement is “Ste-
fani Germanotta.” Therefore, the financing statement sufficiently provides 
the name of the debtor and the security interest remains perfected. Even if 
this were a new security interest, perfection by filing a financing statement 
would require that the financing statement provide “Stefani Germanotta” 
for the debtor’s name.
185
 
                                                 
178 Id. § 9-506(b). The search logic rule of section 9-506(c) does not validate the fi-
nancing statement because a search under the debtor’s correct name, “Bob Dylan,” would 
not produce a financing statement indexed under “Zimmerman.” Id. § 9-506(c). 
179 Section 9-507(c) is discussed more fully supra Part II.B. 
180 U.C.C. § 9-507(c). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
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If the driver’s license expires without issuance of a new license, sec-
tion 9-503(a)(5) governs sufficiency.
186
 That scenario is fully discussed in 
Question 13.
187
 If the driver’s license expires and a license is issued that 
provides the new name, section 9-503(a)(4) controls sufficiency of the 
debtor’s name and section 9-507(c) preserves perfection for some of the 
collateral.
188
 That scenario is fully discussed in Question 14.
189
 If “this 
State” issues a new license before expiration of the current license, sec-
tions 9-503(a)(4) and 9-503(g) combine to require use of the name on the 
new license for sufficiency.
190
 That scenario is fully discussed in Question 
16.
191
 
16. What if the Debtor Changes Her Name, and “this State” Issues 
Her a New Driver’s License? 
Stefani Germanotta, the debtor from Question 15, after legally chang-
ing her name to “Lady Gaga,” obtains a new driver’s license that provides 
her new name. Assuming that her previous license does not automatically 
expire on the issuance of a new license, she now has two unexpired driv-
er’s licenses. Because “this State” has issued an unexpired driver’s license, 
section 9-503(a)(4) provides the sufficiency rule.
192
 When a state has is-
sued multiple unexpired driver’s licenses, section 9-503(g) mandates that 
the most recently issued license is the license used for purposes of 
9-503(a)(4).
193
 
A name change followed by a new license can produce two scenarios. 
In one scenario, the name change creates no problem, because the filed 
financing statement providing the debtor’s previous name is disclosed by a 
standard search logic search under the name on the current license.
194
 In 
that case, the name change does not make the financing statement serious-
ly misleading and the security interest remains perfected in all collater-
                                                 
186 Section 9-503(a)(5) governs because “this State” has not issued an unexpired driv-
er’s license. U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A). 
187 See supra Question 13. 
188 See supra Part II.B (discussing section 9-507(c) more fully). 
189 See supra Question 14. 
190 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4), (g) (Alt. A). 
191 See infra Question 16. 
192 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
193 Id. § 9-503(a)(4), (g) (Alt. A). 
194 The filing records are searched using the current license debtor’s name because 
section 9-506(c) requires a search under the debtor’s “correct name” and section 
9-503(g), Alternative A directs that the name on the most recently issued license is the 
correct name. Id. § 9-506(c); id. § 9-503(g) (Alt. A). 
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al.
195
 That outcome is not possible with our hypothetical since the two 
names are significantly different. 
The other scenario creates a problem because a search under the deb-
tor’s current license name does not produce the filed financing statement. 
That means the financing statement is seriously misleading.
196
 Once again, 
section 9-507(c)(1) continues the effectiveness of the filed financing 
statement for all collateral the debtor acquires before the financing state-
ment becomes seriously misleading or within four months after that 
event.
197
 To perfect the security interest in collateral the debtor acquires 
after the four-month period, the secured party must amend the financing 
statement so it provides the name of the debtor indicated on the current 
license.
198
 In our hypothetical, the secured party must therefore amend the 
financing statement to indicate the name of the debtor as “Lady Gaga.” 
17. What if the Debtor Marries and Takes the Name of the Spouse? 
Assume that a filed financing statement provides the name of the deb-
tor as indicated on the debtor’s current driver’s license. If the debtor mar-
ries, takes the name of the spouse, and does not obtain a new driver’s 
license, this presents the same issue as discussed in detail in Question 15. 
Section 9-503(a)(4) provides the rule for sufficiency of name because the 
facts present an unexpired driver’s license.
199
 Regardless of the new name, 
the name on the driver’s license is required for sufficiency of a financing 
statement.
200
 
If the debtor marries, takes the name of the spouse, and obtains a new 
driver’s license providing the married name, this presents the same issue 
as discussed in detail in Question 16. Assuming the debtor possesses two 
unexpired licenses,
201
 section 9-503(g) designates the most recently issued 
license as the license used for establishing the name of the debtor under 
                                                 
195 See supra Part II.A (discussing section 9-506(c)). 
196 U.C.C. § 9-506(b). 
197 Id. § 9-507(c)(1). 
198 Id. § 9-507(c). Filing the amendment during the four-month grace period provides 
continuous perfection for collateral acquired after four months. Filing after the four-
month period provides perfection for that collateral from the time of filing. See supra Part 
II.B. 
199 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
200 Id. 
201 Whether the debtor has two unexpired driver’s licenses depends on whether the 
laws and regulations of the state provide for the automatic expiration of a previous li-
cense on the issuance of a new license. 
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section 9-503(a)(4).
202
 If the name change makes the financing statement 
seriously misleading, section 9-507(c)(1) maintains perfection for existing 
and four months of after-acquired collateral regardless whether the se-
cured party amends the financing statement to provide the correct name.
203
 
Amending the financing statement is necessary to perfect the security 
interest in collateral acquired more than four months after the financing 
statement becomes seriously misleading.
204
 Because of the likely differ-
ence in the debtor’s married and unmarried names, it is doubtful the search 
logic rule of section 9-506(c) would make the financing statement not 
seriously misleading. 
18. What if the Jurisdiction Governing the Security Interest Changes? 
Suppose an individual debtor who resides in a jurisdiction that adopted 
Alternative A to section 9-503(a)(3) changes her principal residence to a 
jurisdiction that adopted Alternative B. A secured party previously per-
fected its security interest in the Alternative A jurisdiction by filing a fi-
nancing statement that provided the name of the debtor as indicated on the 
debtor’s driver’s license issued by the Alternative A jurisdiction. 
The change in principal residence causes an immediate shift in the law 
that governs perfection of the existing security interest.
205
 In accordance 
with sections 9-301(1) and 9-307(b)(1), perfection of the security interest 
is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is located: his 
principal residence.
206
 Section 9-316 controls the effect that a change in 
governing law has on perfection of a security interest.
207
 Perfection of the 
security interest is in question because the Alternative B jurisdiction has 
become the proper jurisdiction in which to file a financing statement. The 
following explanation of section 9-316 is pertinent also if the governing 
law changes from Alternative B to Alternative A or if the debtor changes 
her principal residence to another Alternative A jurisdiction. 
The security interest perfected under the law of the Alternative A ju-
risdiction remains perfected in the Alternative B jurisdiction until the 
earlier of four months after the change in governing law or the time per-
                                                 
202 U.C.C. § 9-503(g) (Alt. A). 
203 See supra at Part II.B (discussing section 9-507(c)). 
204 U.C.C. § 9-507(c)(2). 
205 Id. § 9-503 cmt. 2d. 
206 Section 9-301(1) provides that the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is lo-
cated governs perfection of a security interest. Id. § 9-301(1). Section 9-307(b)(1) pro-
vides that an individual debtor is located in the jurisdiction of the debtor’s principal 
residence. Id. § 9-307(b)(1). 
207 Id. § 9-316. 
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fection would have ceased under the law of the Alternative A jurisdic-
tion.
208
 This continuing perfection is not contingent on the filing of a fi-
nancing statement in the Alternative B jurisdiction.
209
 For example, sup-
pose the perfection of a security interest perfected under the law of an 
Alternative A jurisdiction would lapse on December 30, 2013.
210
 The 
debtor changes her residence to an Alternative B jurisdiction on July 15, 
2013. Section 9-316(a) continues perfection of the security interest until 
November 15, 2013.
211
 If the secured party perfects the security interest in 
the new jurisdiction before November 15, 2013, the security interest re-
mains perfected thereafter.
212
 In essence, section 9-316(a) creates a grace 
period for the secured party to discover the change in location of the deb-
tor and perfect under the law of the new jurisdiction.
213
 The grace period 
lasts until the earlier of four months after the governing law changes or the 
remaining period of perfection under the previous governing law.
214
 Al-
though this grace period is a maximum of four months, it is less than four 
months in the situation where perfection of the security interest would 
cease under the law of the previous jurisdiction before the expiration of 
four months after the change in governing law.
215
 
Because the governing law is an Alternative B jurisdiction, a financing 
statement sufficiently provides the debtor’s name if it indicates the deb-
tor’s individual name, the surname and first personal name, or the name 
from an unexpired driver’s license issued by the new jurisdiction.
216
 If the 
change in governing law is from an Alternative B jurisdiction to an Alter-
native A jurisdiction, the financing statement sufficiently shows the deb-
tor’s name only if provides the name on the expired driver’s license.
217
 
However, if the new jurisdiction has not issued a license, then either the 
                                                 
208 Id. § 9-316(a)(1)–(2). An amendment to section 9-316 adds a similar rule for colla-
teral the debtor acquires pursuant to an after-acquired property clause of a security 
agreement after a change in governing law. U.C.C. § 9-316(h). 
209 Id. § 9-316(a); see also id. § 9-503. 
210 Most financing statements are effective for five years from the date of their filing. 
Id. § 9-515(a). When the effectiveness of the financing statement ends, a security interest 
perfected by filing becomes unperfected unless a continuation statement is filed. Id. 
§ 9-515(c). 
211 Id. § 9-316(a). 
212 U.C.C. § 9-316(b); see also id. § 9-316(h). 
213 The secured party can increase the odds it will discover the change in location by 
including a term in the security agreement that requires the debtor to notify it of any 
change of residence. 
214 U.C.C. § 9-316(a). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. B). 
217 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
2012] TWENTY QUESTIONS 173 
 
debtor’s individual name or the surname and first personal name is suffi-
cient.
218
 
An important aspect of the change in governing law is the change in 
place of filing a financing statement. Because each jurisdiction’s section 
9-501 will designate an office in that jurisdiction as the place of filing a 
financing statement, a change in governing law will require a new filing if 
the security interest is perfected by filing a financing statement.
219
 Thus, 
even if the debtor’s name is the same in both jurisdictions, perfection of 
the security interest requires a filing in the new jurisdiction.
220
 The grace 
periods of section 9-316(a) grant the secured party time to make that fil-
ing.
221
 
Section 9-316(b) implements grave consequences if the secured party 
fails to perfect in the new jurisdiction before the expiration of the earlier 
of four months after the change or the remaining period of perfection in 
the old jurisdiction.
222
 First, the security interest becomes unperfected.
223
 
Second, it is deemed never to have been perfected against a purchaser of 
the collateral.
224
 “Purchaser” includes a person who takes a security inter-
est.
225
 The second consequence is a “retroactive unperfection” rule.
226
 If a 
purchaser has an interest in the collateral and the secured party does not 
timely perfect in the new jurisdiction, the rule of section 9-316(b) is that 
the security interest never was perfected as against the purchaser.
227
 The 
purchaser will have priority over the security interest regardless whether 
the security interest was perfected before the purchaser acquired its inter-
est.
228
 For example, Bank perfects its security interest by filing a financing 
statement in State A. Later, Lender perfects a security interest in the same 
collateral by filing a financing statement in State A. Bank’s security inter-
est has priority over Lender’s security interest under the first-to-file-or-
                                                 
218 Id. § 9-503(a)(5) (Alt. A). 
219 Id. § 9-501(a). 
220 U.C.C. § 9-316(b). 
221 Id. § 9-316(a). 
222 Id. § 9-316(b). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 The definitions of “purchaser” and “purchase” are found in sections 1-201(b)(30) 
and (29) respectively. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(29)–(30) (2002). A secured party is a purchaser 
under those definitions. Id. 
226 U.C.C. § 9-316(b) cmt. 3 (Approved Amendments 2010). 
227 Id. § 9-316(b). 
228 A perfected security interest has priority over an unperfected security interest. Id. 
§ 9-322(a)(2). 
174 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:139 
 
perfect rule of section 9-322(a)(1).
229
 Debtor changes his principal resi-
dence to State B and Lender files a financing statement in State B. Bank is 
unaware of the change in governing law so it does not file in State B. 
When Bank’s perfection ceases (the earlier of four months after the 
change to State B or the remaining period of perfection in State A), Lend-
er’s security interest gains priority over Bank under the rules of sections 
9-316(b) and 9-322(a)(2).
230
 
19. What Priority Issues Might Arise? 
Two or more security interests can exist in the same collateral.
231
 A 
debtor can use different names on her driver’s licenses issued at different 
times.
232
 The collision of those circumstances raises an interesting priority 
question. Suppose Bank perfects a security interest by filing a financing 
statement that provides the name of the debtor as “Richard Wilson,” the 
name indicated on the debtor’s current driver’s license. The license ex-
pires, and the debt remains unpaid. Debtor obtains a new license that indi-
cates his name as “Dick Wilson.” Six months later, Lender makes a se-
cured loan to debtor and perfects its security interest by filing a financing 
statement that provides the name of the debtor as “Dick Wilson,” the cor-
rect name under section 9-503(a)(4) Alternative A because it is the name 
on the only unexpired driver’s license.
233
 
Regardless of the difference in the name provided on each financing 
statement, both are effective and—assuming all other perfection require-
ments are satisfied—both security interests are perfected. Lender’s financ-
ing statement is effective because it satisfies the debtor’s name require-
ment of section 9-503(a)(4) by providing the name of the debtor as 
indicated on the unexpired driver’s license.
234
 Bank’s financing statement 
is effective under section 9-507(c) notwithstanding that the insufficiency 
of the debtor’s name makes it seriously misleading.
235
 The effectiveness of 
                                                 
229 Id. § 9-322(a)(1). 
230 Id. §§ 9-316(b), 9-322(a)(2). 
231 Id. § 9-322. 
232 See supra Part II.B. 
233 The same problem could arise if the debtor possesses two unexpired driver’s li-
censes. The most recently issued license controls. U.C.C. § 9-503(g) (Alt. A). 
234 Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
235 Id. § 9-507(c). Bank’s financing statement does not sufficiently provide the name 
of the debtor because it indicates the name on the expired driver’s license and the correct 
name is the name indicated on the unexpired driver’s license. Id. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A). 
Thus, the financing statement is seriously misleading regarding the debtor’s name. Id. 
§ 9-506(b), (c). 
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Bank’s financing statement, however, is only for collateral the debtor 
acquired before the financing statement became seriously misleading and 
within four months thereafter.
236
 To perfect the security interest in colla-
teral the debtor acquires more than four months after the financing state-
ment became seriously misleading, Bank must amend the financing state-
ment to provide the correct name.
237
 Bank has not amended its financing 
statement. The result is that there are conflicting perfected security inter-
ests in collateral the debtor acquired before the financing statement be-
came seriously misleading and within four months thereafter. 
Section 9-322(a) determines the priority of conflicting security inter-
ests if no specific rule of Article 9 is applicable to the situation.
238
 It 
awards priority to the security interest that has the earlier date of filing or 
perfection.
239
 Bank’s financing statement remains effective and it was 
filed before Lender’s financing statement. Thus, Bank has priority in col-
lateral the debtor acquired before the financing statement became serious-
ly misleading and within four months thereafter. That Lender’s financing 
statement is the only financing statement that is sufficient as to the deb-
tor’s name does not change the priority between the security interests. 
Lender can gain knowledge of Bank’s filing by requiring Debtor to 
disclose all names he uses and has used and searching through those 
names.
240
 With that knowledge, Lender can decide whether to extend 
credit.
241
 However, a debtor might forget a previously used name or kno-
wingly fail to disclose a name. Those events could cause the debtor to be 
in default under the security agreement with Lender, but they do not 
change the priority between the security interests. 
20. What if the Financing Statement Is Sufficient under Pre-
Amendment Article 9 but Not under Amended Article 9? 
Suppose the debtor’s individual name is Stephen Lynn Wilms. Secured 
party perfects its security interest in December 2012 by filing a financing 
statement providing that name. That financing statement sufficiently pro-
                                                 
236 See supra Part II.B (discussing section 9-507(c)(1)). 
237 U.C.C. § 9-507(c)(2). If a secured party amends the filed financing statement with-
in the four-month period, the security interest is continuously perfected in all collateral 
without any gap in perfection. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
238 U.C.C. § 9-322(f). 
239 Id. § 9-322(a)(1). 
240 Lender could even obtain the debtor’s promise that he has disclosed all current and 
previous names. 
241 Lender could request that Bank subordinate its priority and, if Bank agrees, section 
9-339 recognizes the validity of the agreement. U.C.C. § 9-339 (2002). 
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vides the debtor’s name under pre-amendment Article 9 section 
9-503(a)(4)(A).
242
 The governing jurisdiction enacts section 9-503(a)(4) 
Alternative A, effective July 1, 2013. Although the security interest at-
tached and was perfected under pre-amendment Article 9, section 9-802(a) 
makes amended Article 9 applicable to pre-amendment security interests 
upon the effective date of the amendments.
243
 Consequently, the debtor’s 
name requirements of amended section 9-503(a)(4) apply to secured par-
ty’s filed financing statement. On July 1, 2013, debtor’s unexpired driver’s 
license indicates his name as “Steve Wilms.” Assuming that a standard 
search logic search
244
 under “Steve Wilms” would not produce the filed 
financing statement, the financing statement does not sufficiently provide 
the name of the debtor under amended Article 9 section 9-503(a)(4). Does 
the security interest remain perfected nevertheless? The short answer is 
yes, although the duration and extent of perfection vary depending on 
which section of Article 9 governs this issue and where the financing 
statement was filed. 
There are two possible solutions to this question. First, the effect of the 
transition to amended Article 9 could engage section 9-507(c)—“the name 
that a filed financing statement provides for a debtor becomes insufficient 
as the name of the debtor under Section 9-503(a) so that the filed financ-
ing statement becomes seriously misleading.”
245
 A secured party could 
assert that because amended Article 9 changes the requirements for suffi-
ciency of the debtor’s name, the filed financing statement becomes insuf-
ficient, thus seriously misleading, and results in the applicability of section 
9-507(c).
246
 If section 9-507(c) applies, it makes the financing statement 
effective for collateral the debtor acquired before the financing statement 
became seriously misleading, and within four months thereafter.
247
 Be-
                                                 
242 Id. § 9-503(a)(4)(A) (“A financing statement sufficiently provides the name of the 
debtor ... only if it ... provides the individual ... name of the debtor ....”). 
243 U.C.C. § 9-802(a) (Approved Amendments 2010) (“Except as otherwise provided 
in this part, this [Act] applies to a transaction or lien within its scope, even if the transac-
tion or lien was entered into or created before this [Act] takes effect.”). The brackets 
around “Act” allow a jurisdiction to insert the title it assigns the Article 9 amendments. 
244 Section 9-506(c) renders the error on a financing statement not seriously mislead-
ing if a search under the debtor’s correct name using the filing office’s standard search 
logic would reveal the financing statement. Id. § 9-506(c). See supra part II.A. 
245 U.C.C. § 9-507(c). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. § 9-507(c)(1). An amendment that renders the financing statement not seriously 
misleading must be filed to perfect the security interest in collateral the debtor acquires 
more than four months after the financing statement became seriously misleading. Id. 
§ 9-507(c)(2). 
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cause the financing statement is effective for that collateral, the security 
interest in that collateral remains perfected, although the secured party has 
not amended the financing statement to provide the name on the current 
driver’s license. Under this solution, the extent of perfection is limited to 
time-specific collateral. 
Utilizing section 9-507(c), however, apparently does not align with the 
intent of the drafters of amended Article 9.
248
 Their Comment to section 
9-801 includes an example that is identical to the situation Question 20 
presents.
249
 They address the issue using section 9-805, without mention-
ing section 9-507.
250
 Accordingly, the second solution comes from section 
9-805(b).
251
 However, a brief discussion of section 9-803(b) is warranted 
first because section 9-805(b) is an exception to it.
252
 
A secured party concerned about whether the Article 9 amendments 
will affect perfection of its security interest might be alarmed after reading 
section 9-803(b). It provides that a security interest perfected under pre-
amendment Article 9 that does not satisfy the perfection requirements of 
amended Article 9 remains perfected for only one year after amended 
Article 9 becomes effective.
253
 The amendments to the debtor’s name 
requirements can cause the financing statement to fail to satisfy the 
amended Article 9 perfection requirements.
254
 But the secured party need 
not panic because the one-year rule is subject to section 9-805.
255
 
Section 9-805(b) pertains to a financing statement that satisfies the 
perfection requirements of the applicable governing jurisdiction under pre-
amendment Article 9.
256
 The subheading for subsection (b) is: “When pre-
                                                 
248 Id. § 9-801 cmt. 
249 Section 9-801 is part of the “Transition Provisions for 2010 Amendments,” 
adopted in Article 9, Part 8. The difference between this situation and the comment is the 
name of the individual debtor. 
250 U.C.C. § 9-801 cmt. 
251 Id. § 9-805(b). 
252 Id. § 9-803(b); id. § 9-805(b). 
253 Id. § 9-803(b) (“Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-805, if, immediately 
before this [Act] takes effect, a security interest is a perfected security interest, but the 
applicable requirements for perfection under [Article 9 as amended by this [Act]] are not 
satisfied when this [Act] takes effect, the security interest remains perfected thereafter 
only if the applicable requirements for perfection under [Article 9 as amended by this 
[Act]] are satisfied within one year after this [Act] takes effect.”). 
254 Compare U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4)(A) (2002), with U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(4) (Alt. A) (Ap-
proved Amendments 2010). 
255 U.C.C. § 9-803(b) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
256 Id. § 9-805(b). 
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effective-date filing becomes ineffective.”
257
 Subsection (b) adopts two 
rules.
258
 First, a filed financing statement that perfected a security interest 
under pre-amendment Article 9 is not rendered ineffective.
259
 The implicit 
meaning is that a financing statement effective under pre-amendment 
Article 9 remains effective regardless of whether it satisfies the perfection 
requirements of amended Article 9.
260
 The second rule establishes the 
duration of the effectiveness of the filed financing statement.
261
 The dura-
tion of effectiveness depends on the jurisdiction where the financing 
statement is filed.
262
 
If the financing statement was filed in the same jurisdiction that now 
governs perfection of the security interest, the effectiveness of the financ-
ing statement ceases when its effectiveness would have ceased under pre-
amendment Article 9.
263
 For example, if a security interest was perfected 
by filing a financing statement in Ohio on August 1, 2011, and Ohio law 
governs perfection of the security interest under amended Article 9, the 
financing statement remains effective until August 1, 2016, the length of 
its effectiveness under pre-amendment Article 9.
264
 If the filed financing 
statement was filed in a jurisdiction other than the now governing jurisdic-
tion, the effectiveness of the financing statement ceases at the earlier of 
when its effectiveness would have ceased under pre-amendment Article 9 
or June 30, 2018.
265
 Under this solution the extent of perfection is not 
limited to certain collateral, but the duration of perfection has a limited 
time period.
266
 
                                                 
257 Id. Although the section captions are part of the uniform act, U.C.C. § 1-107 
(2002), the subheadings of Article 9 “are not a part of the official text itself and have not 
been approved by the sponsors.” Id. § 9-101 cmt. 3. Each jurisdiction can decide whether 
to adopt the subheadings. Id. 
258 U.C.C. § 9-805(b) (Approved Amendments 2010). 
259 Id. 
260 A filed financing statement could fail to satisfy the amended Article 9 perfection 
requirements because of differences from pre-amendment Article 9 in the requirements 
for the debtor’s name or a change in governing law caused by differences from pre-
amendment Article 9 in fixing the location of the debtor. 
261 U.C.C. § 9-805(b). The duration rules are qualified by: section 9-805(c) (effective-
ness of a continuation statement), section 9-805(d) (effectiveness of financing statement 
when debtor is a transmitting utility), and section 9-806 (filing an “in lieu” statement to 
continue effectiveness of financing statement). Id. §§ 9-805(c)–(d), 9-806. 
262 Id. § 9-805(b)(2). 
263 Id. § 9-805(b)(1). 
264 This assumes the applicability of the five-year rule for duration of the effectiveness 
of a financing statement under section 9-515(a). Id. § 9-515(a). 
265 Id. § 9-805(b)(2). 
266 U.C.C. § 9-805(b)(2). 
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The good news for the secured party is that under either section 
9-805(b)(1) or (b)(2), the financing statement remains effective when 
Article 9 becomes effective and thus the security interest continues per-
fected without immediate action by the secured party.
267
 Consequently, it 
is not necessary that a secured party review all pre-amendment filings 
before the effective date of amended Article 9 to determine if they will 
satisfy the requirements of amended Article 9. That review is necessary 
when it is time to continue the effectiveness of a pre-amendment financing 
statement.
268
 Returning to the situation Question 20 poses, although the 
filed financing statement does not sufficiently provide the debtor’s name 
under amended Article 9, it remains effective to perfect the security inter-
est because it was sufficient under pre-amendment Article 9 to perfect the 
security interest. 
CONCLUSION 
It is of upmost importance that the secured party correctly provides the 
name of the debtor on the financing statement. Failure to do so can result 
in the security interest being unperfected. It seems as if compliance would 
be uncomplicated but, in the case of individual debtors, ascertaining the 
correct name can require choosing among alternatives. Choosing the 
wrong name can prove a fatal error. 
The Article 9 drafters have attempted to remedy this problem through 
amendments to the Article 9 requirement for sufficiency of an individual 
debtor’s name. They have adopted rules that specify what name or names 
are sufficient. These rules seem well-designed to facilitate a secured par-
ty’s compliance with the requirement. As with all rules of law, however, 
applying the rule to the facts of the situation raises questions. 
A secured party attempting to comply with the driver’s-license-name-
only rule of section 9-503(a)(4) Alternative A will encounter many situa-
tions, including multiple driver’s licenses, no driver’s license, unexpired 
driver’s license, multiple names, and changed names. The questions I ask 
and answer in this Article address these issues. They give the secured 
                                                 
267 See id. § 9-805(b)(1)–(2). 
268 When the effectiveness of the financing statement ceases after the effective date of 
the Article 9 amendments, the secured party must file either: (1) if the amendments have 
not changed the office for filing a financing statement, a continuation statement that 
satisfies the requirements of amended Article 9, U.C.C. § 9-805(c), (e); or (2) if the initial 
financing statement was filed in a different jurisdiction, an “in lieu” statement that satis-
fies the financing statement requirements of amended Article 9, identifies the pre-
effective-date financing statement by filing office, date and file numbers, and indicates 
that the financing statement remains effective. Id. § 9-806. 
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party a start on sufficiently providing the name of an individual debtor on 
a financing statement. These twenty questions came to my mind early in 
my study of section 9-503(a)(4) Alternative A, but I can predict with near 
certainty that other questions involving the debtor’s name will confound 
secured parties in the future. Secured parties must stay vigilant to protect 
perfection of their security interests. 
